bradgrafelman wrote:If they compromised the entire database, then yes.
Although not as much as kreali might be thinking....
If the password alone is hashed (without any salting) then existing dictionary attacks can be used to discover all of the commonly-used passwords (and a lot of them are commonly used) so that, for example, reversing the SHA-1 hash "f3bbbd66a63d4bf1747940578ec3d0103530e21d" is little more than a Google search away.
Salting blocks this. Even if the salt is known to be "23923" it doesn't help the dictionary attacker, because "common-password23923" is much less likely to be in the dictionary in the first place. The attacker would need a new dictionary - one in which every "common password" has "23923" appended. And with the salt varying from user to user....
While knowing part of the salted password might theoretically give a handle on cracking the rest, modern hash algorithms are designed with the aim of making the task at least as difficult as brute-forcing is tedious.
With the ever-increasing availability of computing power, of course, more elaborate attacks combining brute-force with analysis become more feasible. SHA-1 has already been deprecated in favour of the SHA-2 family (SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512; see [man]hash[/man]) and NIST expects to pick SHA-3 from among the remaining five contenders later this year.